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general feeling of the court toward allowing the claim in the
instant case.34
In allowing recovery in quantum meruit after disallowing recovery on the contract, they pointed out that the doctrine of election of remedies did not act as a bar. A party is said to elect
a remedy when he chooses between irreconcilable and inconsistent
claims. This harsh doctrine has been criticised by the court in
previous cases, 35 and the Legislature has enacted sections which
have delinited the area of the doctrine's use. 6 "The concept of
election of remedies . . . is out of line with modern procedural

concepts of unlimited joinder of causes of action regardless of
consistency,
and the liberal allowance of amendment of plead37
ings."

Perhaps it will not be long before the doctrine will become

completely obsolete.
IV.

CO MMCT OF LAws

The conflict of laws cases decided in the past term were
predominantly occupied with choice of law questions. Of the four
cases discussed in the section, all had this issue as their focal
point, although the first also included a jurisdictional problem.
While choice of law involves the evaluation of many factors,' it
is interesting to note the role played by that of policy. Local
policy considerations were given great weight in the first two cases,
a fundamental public policy guided the third, and the last decision
was involved mainly with the question of whether or not the application of foreign law was violative of local policy. It is also
notable that the desire, although subconscious, of a forum to prefer
the lex fori was laudably suppressed in two of the four cases.
Garnishment
Assuming a testamentary trust of personalty to have been
validly created, a problem arises as to what law should be applied
to questions concerning the administration of the trust. It is
usually presumed to be the law of the testator's last domicile,2 but
this can be rebutted by a clear or implied indication that the testa34. McKeon v. Van Slyke, 223 N. Y. 392, 119 N. E. 851 (1918) ; Harmon v. Alfred
Peats Co., 243 N. Y. 473, 154 N. E. 314 (1926).
35. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 230 N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295

(1921); Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924); Clark

v. Kirby, 243 N. Y. 295, 153 N. E. 79 (1926).
36. C. P. A. § 112(a-h), (enacted since 1939).

37.

PRASHKER,

op. cit. supra note 28, 207-208.

1. See Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COL. L. REv. 95
(1952).
2. REsTATEmENT, CoNxincT oF LAws §298, comment a (1934).
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tor intended that another law should govern.' If these rules lead
to the conclusion that a foreign state controls the administration
of a trust, are the New York courts then deprived of jurisdiction
to garnish the income from trust funds admittedly located there ?
This question was answered in the negative in Erdhein v. Mabee.4
The issue arose in a garnishment proceeding in which a judgment creditor was seeking to reach income payable to his debtor
as beneficiary under a testamentary trust. The testator, a domiciliary of the District of Columbia, where the will was probated,
had designated a New York trust company and a resident of
Wisconsin as co-trustees. Property comprising the trust fund was
on deposit at the head office of the trust company in New York
City. In a proceeding brought by the co-trustees in the District
of Columbia in 1931 for the settlement of their first account, the
court had issued a decree containing a provision "that jurisdiction
. . . is hereby retained for such further orders and instructions
regarding the administration of the trust estate as may be deemed
necessary."
The Court of Appeals, in affirming (4-2) the Appellate Division,6 rested its decision on two grounds. Judge Conway first
questioned the District of Columbia's declaring itself to be the
place of administration, since the testator had appointed as trustee
a trust company of another state.7 This, together with the fact
that he had provided for investment and commissions under New
York law, and that the testator undoubtedly realized that the
trustee would actively administer the trust and keep the res in New
York, implied his intention of choosing a place of administration
other than his own domicile.
The second, and main, basis of decision was that even if full
faith and credit must be accorded the District of Columbia's retention of control over the administration of the trust, New York
could still reach the income from a trust res which was physically
within the state and apply it to the payment of judgments of resi3. Appointment of a trust company of a foreign state as trustee, id. § 298, comment

c; another jurisdiction having a more "substantial connection" with the trust, 19

CoL. L. REv. 486 (1919) ; another state having a "preponderance of the operative factors"
which include domicile of the testator at death, language of the trust instrument, place
of probate of the will, location of the trust res, domicile of the trustee, domicile of
the beneficiary, place in which the business of the trust is carried on, and intention of
the testator, Note, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 360 (1941) ; Swabenland, The Conflict of Laws
in Administration of Express Trusts of Personal Property, 45 YALE L. J. 438 (1936).
4. 305 N. Y. 307, 113 N. E. 2d 433 (1953).

5. C. P. A. §684.
6. 279 App. Div. 988, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 592 (1st Dep't 1952).

7. RESTATFEENT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 298, comment c; see Bank of New York
v. Shillito, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 458, 462 (Sup. Ct. 1939). But c. In re Cronin, 326 Pa. 343,

349-350, 192 Atl. 397, 400 (1937).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

dent judgment creditors. The opinion stated, "The courts of this
State are not wholly without power to protect a resident creditor
at least so far as the relief to be secured relates to property within
the jurisdiction of the court and unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor." ' The court concluded that such a statutory
garnishment was not a violation of the "administration" of the
trust.9

The dissent, by Judge Desm'ond, pointed out that the court
was subjecting the trustees to two conflicting sets of instructions,
by two different courts. New York courts were making a direction
for payment of income contrary to the terms of the trust itself
and the directions of the court administering the trust.
In the instant case there was no question raised as to the
validity of the trust, the beneficiary's being alive, or the amount of
income due to him. The New York court was merely attempting
to reach what was admittedly due to defendant from property
within the state, by statutory garnishment.' 0 Irrespective of
whether this may be said to be technically within the province of
"administration" of a trust," the jurisdiction whose law governs
administration should not be heard to complain. The instant case
was just another example of the fundamental principle that every
state has jurisdiction to determine for itself the liability of property located within its territorial limits, especially where it is to
be. applied to the satisfaction of a judgment obtained in this state
by a resident creditor."2
Statute of Frauds
Whether compliance with the Statute of Frauds is a matter
of procedure or evidence to be ruled by the lex fori, or a matter
of the substantive validity of a transaction, normally governed by
the law of the place of occurrence, has long been the subject of
8.Supra note 4 at 315, 113 N. E. 2d at 437; see Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y.
381, 388-289, 187 N. E. 65, 68 (1933) ; Bergmann v. Lord, 194 N. Y. 70, 78, 86 N. E.
828, 831 (1909).
9. A consideration of the remaining issue in the case, compliance -with the New
York garnishment statute, resulted in the conclusion that the conditions of the statute
were fulfilled.
10. If a somewhat analogous situation arose before judgment under the attachment statute, it is very probable that jurisdiction would be assumed, since the Court
of Appeals has stated that the attachment and garnishment statutes must be read together, in pari materia. See Morris Plan Ind. Bank v. Gunning, 295 N. Y. 324, 331, 67
N. E. 2d 510, 513 (1946) ; cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Young, 258 App. Div. 323,
16 N. Y. S. 2d 324 (4th Dep't 1939).
11. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1024 (1935), states that the power of the beneficiary's creditors to reach the trust res or its income is a question of administration.
12. Accord, Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't
1902) ;see Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211, 213 (1935) ; Disconto Gesellschaft v. Urnbreit, 208 U. S. 570, 580 (1908).

